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I. Introduction
The importance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to economic growth due to the
technology transfers has been documented in many studies1. Technology transfer should
help reduce the gap between developed and developing countries, since there is a lack
of innovation in the latter group.
In a recent trend, developing countries have introduce di↵erent measures in order to
attract FDI. Many factors a↵ect the level of FDI in a country: political stability, labor
market regulations, institutional framework, and market size can all attract or deter
FDI. In the current state of economic globalization, with the increasing importance
of intangible assets, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) play an important role in the
decision to invest abroad2.
There is still some controversy as to the e↵ect of stronger IPR on the welfare of the
host economy. On the one hand, people advocate for stronger IPR on the grounds that
they provide the protection necessary for production to shift to a developing country and
thus release resources from developed countries to advance the technological frontier.
On the other hand, stronger IPR’s also reduce the ability of local firms in the host
economy to be exposed to new technologies, and they create a monopoly e↵ect that
reduces the need to increase R&D in the foreign a liate.
Awareness of the importance of IPR has increased in the last fifteen years due to the
implementation of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement
in 1995 by the World Trade Organization (WTO). As stated by the WTO, “it (the
agreement) establishes minimum levels of protection that each government has to give
to the intellectual property of fellow WTO members”.
In Chile, the first industrial property legislation was approved in 1991. There were
a few modifications to the law, the most important being the approval of a new law in
2005 that made significant changes to IPR, starting with the creation of a court specific
to industrial property issues.
This study analyzes the e↵ect of strengthening IPR on inward FDI in Chile during
the 2001–2007 period. In an important contribution, this paper validates and comple-
ments previous empirical studies, especially as most of them analyze a cross-section of
countries rather than the evolution of firms over time. Moreover, since the study period
is very recent, the implications of a change in the IPR framework could be di↵erent
from the those of previous studies.
During the past two decades, Chile has been growing at a fast and steady pace.
Hence, it is important to analyze the e↵ect of stronger IPR not only on the flow of FDI
1Throughout the paper, FDI refers to inward FDI, that is, investment by a Multinational Enterprise
(MNE) in a subsidiary in a host country.
2For example, Mansfield (1994) conducts a survey of 100 U.S. firms to determine the extent to
which the level of IPR a↵ects their decisions to invest in six di↵erent industries.
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but also on the imitative activity of the country. Stronger IPR tend to deter imitative
activities and to increase the market power of MNEs in the host country.
Regarding FDI, as has been noted in many studies, once an MNE decides to service
a market abroad, this can be done using three di↵erent channels: i) it can export, ii) it
can shift its production (FDI), and iii) it can license its knowledge to another firm.
In a very complete survey, Park (2008) reviews the di↵erent issues related to IPR
and innovation. One way to model FDI flows from developed countries (the North)
to developing countries (the South) is through product-cycle models. In the basic
framework, innovation occurs in the North, while there is a level of imitation in the
South. Once the good is standardized, this leads to investment in and product-shifting
to the South to obtain rents from lower wages. These types of models are still relevant,
and a key aspect of their validity is the imitative ability of the South. Thus, any factor
that a↵ects the imitative ability of the South is likely to a↵ect the level of FDI in the
country3.
The results obtained from purely theoretical models are ambiguous and depend on
the initial assumptions. Helpman (1993) and Glass and Saggi (2002) develop models
that conclude that stronger IPR in the South lead to lower rates of innovation in the
North, while Lai (1998) and Yang and Maskus (2001) conclude that stronger IPR in
the South lead to higher levels of innovation in the North.
Therefore, it is important to validate di↵erent theoretical approaches with empirical
studies in order to determine the e↵ect of IPR on FDI, especially when there is a high
volume of data with which to conduct this type of analysis.
II. FDI in Chile
FDI in Chile has fluctuated considerably over the last decade. This can be seen in the
following figure. It is clear that there was an important inflow of FDI in the late 90s
due to the privatization process in Chile.
After peaking in 1999, FDI started to decline, reaching a minimum of $2,500 million
(3.8% of GDP). However, after this minimum, FDI started to increase again, reaching
another peak in 2007 at $12,500 million (7.6% of GDP).
It is important to note that even though the increases in FDI that occurred after
2002 seem to be of great magnitude, as a percentage of GDP, the only large increase
happened in 2004 when FDI reached 7.5% of GDP. In the other years, it averaged 5.5%
of GDP.
Another important point is that Figure 1 is taken from the Balance of Payments
(BOP) data, and there is no decomposition of these values by economic sector. Thus,
3For a more thorough discussion of these types of models, see, for example, Vernon (1966); Grossman
and Helpman (1991); and Park (2008).
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Figure 1: FDI in Chile 1998–2007 (Million of US dollars)
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators.
it is possible that the changes represented in Figure 1 do not reflect FDI in the manu-
facturing sector, which is the focus of this paper.
Nevertheless, a government institution, the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC)
addresses the portion of investors who choose to use the Foreign Investment Statute
(DL600) as a means to invest in Chile4. The following figure shows the amount of FDI
in Chile under DL600 by sector.
Figure 2: FDI in Chile 1998-2007 (By Sector, in Million of US dollars, under DL600)
Source: Chilean Foreign Investment Committee (FIC).
As can be seen in Figure 2, FDI in Chile shows a similar pattern under DL600 and
4DL600 allows foreign investors to choose this regime when investing in Chile. Thus, investment
under DL600 constitutes only part of recorded FDI in the BOP data. The di↵erence between DL600
investment and investment in the BOP includes other capital and reinvestment.
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the BOP in the late 90’s and early 2000s. However, the similarities end by the mid-
2000s. Importantly, FDI under DL600 starts to decrease after 2004. Regarding the
manufacturing sector, it is very clear that FDI has significantly decreasing in the last
few years, which is also shown in Table 6 (see the appendix). This suggests either that
there are fewer foreign plants in the manufacturing sector or that the existing plants
have significantly decreased in size.
III. Related Literature
Empirical studies have shed some light on the e↵ect of stronger IPR on trade flows and
FDI5. Most studies examine FDI outflows from a developed country at the firm level
(most studies use U.S. data). The greatest weakness of these studies is that, due to data
constraints, they focus on cross-sectional analysis of FDI flows to di↵erent countries in
a single year.
In recent years, as more data have became available, higher quality studies on FDI
as the source of innovation have emerged. However, work analyzing the evolution of
FDI remains scant. In particular, the existing work has been on FDI flowing out of a
country (outward FDI) rather than on FDI flows into a given country (inward FDI).
Moreover, there is debate about which measure of IPR strength in best6.
In one of the first attempts to study the relationship between international patent
a liation (the Paris Convention or the Berne Convention) and the a liate level of sales,
Ferrantino (1993) finds no significant evidence that a liation a↵ects trade or FDI.
Using U.S. data for almost 100 firms, Lee and Mansfield (1996) study the volume
and composition of FDI in di↵erent countries in which there are di↵erent perceptions
of IPR strength7. Their study encompasses six manufacturing industries in fourteen
countries. They examine the volume of total U.S. investment in the manufacturing
sector. They find that perceptions of weaker IPR lead to lower levels of FDI. Moreover,
when they analyze the composition of FDI, they only use fourteen chemical firms and
the ratio of FDI that was used sales and distribution to FDI used in manufacturing
products. Using a Tobit model, they find that the percentage devoted to sales and
distribution is positively related to weak IPR.
Braga and Fink (1998) criticize the results obtained by Lee and Mansfield (1996)
based on the fact that the perception index used as a proxy for IPR strength includes
other factors, such as the imitative capacity of the host country. To resolve this issue,
they use a measure of IPR strength developed by Rapp and Rozek (1990) and a larger
sample of countries; nevertheless, their results are in line with those ofLee and Mansfield
(1996).
5For a discussion of the relation between trade and IPR, see Maskus and Penubarti (1995).
6The di↵erent measures of IPR will be discussed in the empirical approach section.
7They use the perceptions of IPR strength collected by Mansfield (1994).
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Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004) use U.S. data disaggregated at the industry level
for more than one hundred countries and di↵erent measures of IPR strength. The
hypothesis they test relies on the fact that FDI flows to di↵erent countries depend
on industry and host- country characteristics. They also consider di↵erent dependent
variables to test whether stronger IPR a↵ect the quantity and quality of FDI.
They use the industry FDI stocks of 166 countries. They also have data on sales,
value added, employment, total employee compensation, exports and imports, local
R&D expenditures and license fees paid to the U.S. for a subsample of countries (58).
A new feature of this study is that they compare two di↵erent years, 1995 and
2000. They focus on seven manufacturing industries in 1995 and five in 20008. They
supplement these data with country characteristics (GDP per capita and average years
of schooling).
To measure IPR, they follow Ginarte and Park (1997), and IPR strength is mea-
sured by the World Economic Forum(WEF)9. The specifications include traditional
FDI determinants as controls, such as GDP per capita, population, distance from the
U.S. and two institutional indicators. To analyze FDI quality, they examine host R&D
expenditures, value added and exports of the a liate.
They find that IPR are not significant when host-country characteristics are not
taken into account. They then interact host-country characteristics with the IPR mea-
sures and find that IPR are only significant when host-country characteristics are taken
into account. Moreover, they find no significant di↵erences when using di↵erent IPR
measures. They find that stronger IPR increase the quality of FDI in the host countries
(as measured by R&D, value added, and exports of the a liate).
In another study, Smith (2001) examines the e↵ect of foreign patent rights on U.S.
exports, sales in the host country and licenses. A new approach is used, since the e↵ect
of IPR on the three modes used by MNEs (exports, sales by a liates, and licensing)
are examined simultaneously. The data include 50 countries in 1989.
Smith (2001) tests whether stronger IPR increase exports, sales via a liates and
licenses in order to determine whether the market expansion e↵ect or the market power
e↵ect is stronger10. Other tests examine whether strong IPR lead to knowledge transfer
to the host country and whether the transfer of knowledge occurs within the same
8In 1995, the industries are food, chemicals, metals, machinery, electronic equipment, transport
equipment and other manufacturing. In 2000, the industries are food, chemicals, metals, machinery
and electronic equipment, and transport equipment.
9The Ginarte-Park IPR strength measure is constructed quinquennially using five categories of
patent laws to form an index that ranges from 0 to 5. The WEF measure will be explained in more
detail later.
10The market expansion e↵ect refers to higher production (through exports, sales, or licenses) in
the foreign market, since the technology being transferred is better protected. The market power
e↵ect refers to the fact that stronger IPR confer more market power on the MNE in the host country,
reducing the level of production in the foreign market.
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firm11.
The findings show a positive relation between IPR strength and the sales of U.S.
a liates in a host country. There is also a positive e↵ect of IPR on licenses granted to
foreign firms. However, the level of exports is not significantly a↵ected by IPR. This
leads to the conclusion that strong IPR exert a market expansion e↵ect in the host
country rather than a market power e↵ect. Moreover, the e↵ect is larger in countries
that have high imitative capacity.
Additionally, stronger IPR increase the location advantage for the MNE, since there
is a stronger e↵ect on licenses than on a liate sales. Thus, it is possible that MNEs
reduce their level of FDI and use licensing instead.
The most relevant study using foreign data is Javorcik (2004b), which focuses not
only on the e↵ect of stronger IPR on inward FDI but also on the composition of FDI
in twenty-four economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
To test these hypotheses, they examine the e↵ect of stronger IPR in tech-intensive
sectors – the same sectors used in Mansfield (1994). The second hypothesis tests
whether the investor sets up production facilities or only engages in distribution/advertising
activities, thus di↵erentiating between “productive” FDI and FDI that does not increase
productivity and is solely used to increase sales.
She finds that weaker IPR have two e↵ects, one direct e↵ect deterring FDI and a
compositional e↵ect increasing the investment in distribution projects rather than local
production or R&D.
In a more recent study, Branstetter et al. (2006) analyze the e↵ect of IPR reforms in
sixteen countries during the 1982–1999 period. Using U.S. firm-level data, they analyze
the e↵ects of stronger IPR measures on international technology transfer.
They conclude that royalty payments for technology transferred increased at the
time of the reform. Additionally, R&D expenditures in the host country increased,
especially for firms that use patents extensively. This study represents a breakthrough
in the literature, since panel data is required to perform a competent analysis.
A more complete study by Branstetter et al. (2007)followed12. Using the same data
as Branstetter et al. (2006), this study is the closest in spirit to the hypotheses tested
for the Chilean economy in this paper.
They develop a theoretical model that predicts that stronger IPR measures lead to
higher FDI due to the shifting of production to a liates in developing countries. This,
in turn, frees resources in developed countries so that more innovation can take place.
They test the model empirically by examining production-shifting to developing
countries (increasing the scale of production by a liates). They approach this problem
11If sales by a liates are highly a↵ected by the reform, then knowledge transfer occurs within the
same firm, whereas if the reform a↵ects licenses, then knowledge is transferred to an external firm.
12Hereafter, BFFS.
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using the following equation:
Silt = ↵0 + ↵il + ↵t +  0yjt +  1Pit +  2Hjt +  3Rjt +  4Rjt⇤Techil + "it (1)
where i indexes the a liate’s parent firm, l the a liate, j the host country, and t
the year. The dependent variable is a measure of the scale of the a liate Silt; they
use capital stock, employment compensation, use of technology from the parent firm
and R&D expenditures. They control for a liate fixed e↵ects, time fixed e↵ects and
country-specific time trends. P and H are parent characteristics and host-country
characteristics, respectively13.
In equation 1, Rjt is a reform dummy variable that takes the value zero before the
reform and one afterward. Tech  il is a dummy variable that equals one for a liates
with high technology transfer from the parent and zero for low technology transfer14.
They find that MNE’s increase their capital stock and employment compensation
but reduce royalties paid after IPR reforms. These results are compatible with the idea
that there is production-shifting to developing countries.
Another hypothesis tested in their study is whether the increase in production by
MNEs o↵sets the reduction in the production of imitators in developing countries.
This is done by examining industry-level outcomes before and after the reform. The
specification in this case is:
V Aijt = ↵0 + ↵ij + ↵t +  0yjt ++ 1Hjt +  2Rjt +  3Rjt⇤IndTechi + "it (2)
In this case, the dependent variable is the value added in industry i in country j and
year t. The IndTech dummy is equal to one for technologically intensive industries15.
Using this specification, they find that “output expansion is concentrated in technology
intensive industries”16.
Both studies, (Branstetter et al., 2006, 2007), include the Chilean IPR reform of
1991. However, they do not take into account the more recent reform in 2005. Moreover,
a limitation of their analysis is that they use only statutory measures of changes in
IPR17. This method does not allow for lagged implementation of new regulations.
13Their results can be viewed in appendix C (Table 8).
14To assign a value for Tech, they use the median license payments from a liates to parent firms
over four years prior to a particular reform. A liates with license payments above the median are
assigned a value of one; those below the median, zero.
15The industries included are electrical machinery, industrial chemicals, other chemicals, professional
and scientific equipment, and transportation equipment.
16The results can be viewed in appendix C (Table 9).
17This means that they use a dummy variable for reform, implying that regulatory changes and
enforcement occur instantaneously.
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The main contribution of this paper is to clarify the relevance of a change in IPR on
FDI flows in Chile. Thus, it is important to validate the results found by BFFS after
more than a decade of rapid economic growth. Moreover, it is important to determine
the reaction of the economy as a whole to stronger IPR, since imitative activity may
have increased in the past decades. It is also possible that MNEs now prefer granting
licenses to investing abroad.
It is important to validate the results of other empirical studies because, in most
cases, they examine older data from before the implementation of TRIPS by WTO
members. Thus, the results of BFFS come from economies in which a full IPR structure
was not yet implemented.
Another important feature of this study is the use of a very extensive survey of the
Chilean manufacturing sector. The data come from the Chilean Annual Manufacturing
Census (ENIA), which includes all establishments with 10 or more workers. This allows
for a thorough analysis of the manufacturing sector using panel data. This dataset also
allows the assessment of entry-exit decisions by foreign firms. This type of survey
has not yet been used extensively, since most previous studies have conducted only
cross-sectional analyses.
IV. Data
The plant-level data used in this series of studies come from the Chilean Encuesta
Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA)18. The survey is conducted by the National Statistics
Institute (INE) of Chile and covers all establishments (plants) with ten or more workers.
The years covered by this study are 2001–2007.
Previous versions of this census have been used by Pavcnik (2002) and Lopez (2008),
among others. However, they use previous waves of the census. One study that uses
the census for the 2001–2006 period is Gibson and Graciano (2011).
The unit of observation is the establishment’s (plant). There are firms that only
have one plant; however, other firms have multiple plants that are integrated either
vertically or horizontally (multi-plant and multi-activity firms).
In the case of multiple plants, the survey includes each plant that belong to a firm.
Each plant has its own ID number for statistical secrecy reasons; thus, it is not possible
to identify which plants belong to a given firm19. Thus, each plant has a unique ID
number that allows its performance to be tracked over time, permitting longitudinal
studies. In the present paper, the terms “plant” and “firm” will be used interchangeably.
To classify the economic activity of each plant, the International Standard Industrial
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) revision 3 produced by the United
18This is a national survey of the manufacturing sector.
19This could be a problem if the majority of firms are multi-plant; however, as noted by Pavcnik
(2002), in a previous version of this dataset, approximately 90% of firms have one plant.
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Nations was used20. Economic activities are considered at the four-digit level21.
IV.I Data Cleaning
The original dataset contains 37,307 observations. The first thing to note about the
dataset is that starting in 1974, Chile was divided into 13 regions. However, in 2007,
two regions were split, Tarapaca´ became Arica y Parinacota and Tarapaca´; and Los
Rios became Los Rios and Los Lagos. In order to maintain the consistency of the
dataset, the 1974 division is maintained throughout the study period.
Next, since all the monetary variables in the dataset are in current pesos, it is
necessary to deflate them into real pesos. Two di↵erent deflators are used. This study
relies on the estimation of Total Factor Productivity (TFP); thus, for all variables that
enter into the estimation of TFP, such as sales, we use a 4-digit deflator specifically
designed by the INE for this survey. For variables that have a broader macroeconomic
meaning, such as the value of licenses paid or wages, it makes more sense to use a more
general deflator. For these variables, we use a more encompassing deflator, the GDP
deflator, provided by the Central Bank of Chile22.
Some observations were purged in the data cleaning process. First, we dropped one
observation for which the value added for the firm was extremely high in one year. It
is also important to note that even though there might be some negative value added
figures (due to the fact that it is calculated as the production value minus intermediate
goods), those observations remain in the dataset. This could be a concern for the TFP
estimation; however, as will be clear in the estimation section, we use revenue (sales)
for TFP estimation instead of value added.
The rest of the observations that are excluded are firms that change industries
or regions (locations) during the study period. Even though it could be argued that
there is a loss of information in this case, the counter argument is twofold. First,
the number of observations lost is not extremely high, and second, when estimating a
model using fixed e↵ects, the main assumption is that these fixed e↵ects capture all the
characteristics of a firm that do not change over time. Thus, a change in industry or
region would invalidate the interpretation of the results23. The final dataset has 36,026
plant-year observations in 111 industries.
20See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?cl=2 for more details.
21The covered industries, in terms of ISIC (Rev.3) codes, are 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36. The ISIC (Rev.3) codes for the manufacturing sector range from
15 to 36. Industries 16 (tobacco) and 23 (coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel) have no
observations in the dataset.
22The deflator used in this series of studies is the 4-digit deflator for TFP estimation, although we
compare the results obtained from using the GDP deflator, the 2-digit deflator and the 4-digit deflator
for variables such as license payments.
23A more detailed explanation will be provided in the empirical section.
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IV.II Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables. It is important to note that
most of the capital stock is held by domestic plants, while foreign firms hold only 31%
of the capital stock, on average24. However, this is a very high percentage compared to
the percentage of foreign firms.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables (36,026 Obs.)
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Capital Stock 2,611 26,352 0 2,140,000
% Domesic Capital 95 20 0 1001
% Foreign Capital 5 20 0 100
Value Added 3,052 26,766 118,000 1,860,000
Sales Of Production 4,960 37,206 0 1,810,000
Payments for Licenses And Foreign Assistance 8 152 0 11,864
Income Due To Exports 1,779 17,771 0 1,020,000
Number of Skilled Workers 15 58 0 2,691
Skilled/Unskilled workers ratio 1 4 0 287
Skilled/Total workers ratio 0 0 0 1
Note: All monetary values are in 2003 Million Pesos. Value added has negative values
due the calculation method, the di↵erence between gross production value and
intermediate consumption.
To determine which firms are considered foreign, we used a 10% capital rule (i.e., if
the foreign capital holdings of the establishment exceed 10%, it is considered foreign).
The resulting di↵erentiation is presented in table table 2.
Table 2: Number of Firms by Type of Ownership (10% capital rule)
Owner Freq. Percent Cum.
Domestic 33,992 94. 94.
Foreign 2,034 6. 100
Total 36,026 100
Moreover, it is possible to analyze the number of firms that operate only in the
domestic market, those that sell to the domestic market and export, and those that
only export. This distribution is depicted in table table 3.
When analyzing the dynamics of foreign presence in Chile, one striking feature is
depicted in the figure below. There is a drastic decline in the number of foreign plants
after 2004, and the 2007 level is even lower than that in 2001.
24This calculation is not shown in table table ??, but it is available upon request.
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Table 3: Distribution of Firms according to Market Service
Market Freq. Percent Cum.
Non-exporter 28,641 79.5 79.5
Domestic and Ecporter 7,101 19.71 99.21
Exporter 284 0.79 100
Total 36,026 100
Figure 3: Number of Foreign Plants
Figure 3 above also illustrates this fact: it seems that FDI in the manufacturing
sector has been decreasing steadily in the last few years.
To estimate TFP, the data have been grouped at the 2-digit ISIC level. To better
understand the distribution of the data, consider the number of observations and the
description of each 2-digit ISIC group presented in table table 7 of the appendix.
To better analyze the dynamics of domestic and foreign firms, as well as of entry
and exit, it is possible to construct transition tables to quantify the entry and exit of
foreign plants. The average transition matrix for any two years in the 2001–2007 period
is depicted in table table 4.
This matrix is interpreted as follows. Say we take the Domestic-Domestic cell in the
matrix, which shows that for the entire period, 25,592 firms were domestic in period t
and remained domestic in period t + 1. The Foreign-Domestic cell shows how many
plants changed from foreign to domestic, and so on. The Enter row shows how many
plants entered the Chilean market in t + 1, while the Exit column shows how many
plants exited in period t.
There are a few important things to note from this transition table. First, it is clear
that the number of domestic firms has decreased in this period (this is due mostly to
a decrease in the number of firms in 2007). At the same time, the number of foreign
firms has stayed relatively constant (1,767-1,763). Second, the previous comment is
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Table 4: Transition Matrix for 2001–2007
2001-2007
Period t+1
Domestic Foreign Exit Total
Period t
Domestic 25,592 129 3,695 29,416
Foreign 167 1,419 181 1,767
Enter 3,546 215 0 3,761
Total 29,305 1,763 3,876
confirmed by the number of exits for domestic firms (3,695) and the number of entrants
(3,546).
However, a note of caution is needed here, since the total number of plants (domestic
and foreign) has decreased since 2004. Therefore, the previous conjecture should be
tested more rigorously.
It is possible to decompose the above transition matrix into the periods before and
after the IPR reform in 2005. The resulting transition matrices are depicted in table
table 5.
Table 5: Transition Matrices (Before and After IPR Reform)
2001-2004 (BEFORE)
Period t+1
Domestic Foreign Exit Total
Period t
Domestic 16,981 83 2,571 19,635
Foreign 117 937 115 1,169
Enter 3,546 215 0 3,761
Total 20,644 1,235 2,686
2005-2007 (AFTER)
Period t+1
Domestic Foreign Exit Total
Period t
Domestic 8,611 46 1,124 9,781
Foreign 50 482 66 598
Enter 690 35 0 725
Total 9,351 563 1,190
The most important thing to note from these matrices is the change in the entry/exit
ratio. Before the IPR reform, this ratio was 1.87, while after the reform, the ratio
decreased substantially to 0.53. Thus, after the reform, more foreign firms were exiting
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the market than before. This finding was also reflected in figure 3.
V. Measures of IPR
Two di↵erent measures of IPR are used in this study, a dummy variable at the time of
the change and the Fraser index.
The dummy variable takes the value one on and after the year of the reform (2005)
and zero otherwise. This is the type of measure used by Branstetter et al. (2007).
However, since this change does not happen overnight, it is also useful to take
into account a survey measure related to IPR and property rights in general. Thus,
the second measure of protection comes from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom
in the World report. In this case, the following question is asked: “Property rights,
including over financial assets, are poorly defined and not protected by law (= 0) or
are clearly defined and well protected by law (= 10)25”.
The two di↵erent measures can be viewed in the graph below. Note that the Fraser
index and the dummy measure follow the same trend, so we should not expect di↵erences
to stem from using either measure.
Figure 4: IPR Strength Measures
VI. Empirical Approach
Since the IPR law change constitutes a treatment-e↵ect type of estimation, we use a
Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences (DD) approach, where the main assumption is that firms that
25The formula used by the Fraser Institute is based in the index created by another institution,
the World Economic Forum, in its Global Competitiveness report. The relation used is: EFWi =
[(GCRi  1)/6] ⇤ 10.
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were technologically intensive before the reform exhibit the same pattern in inward FDI
as firms that were not ”technologically intensive” in the absence of a reform.
As stated above, changes in FDI can occur at either the extensive or the intensive
margin. Regarding the intensive margin, it is possible to analyze the expansion of the
production of foreign plants in the entire period in a given industry. As explained in
the data section, when talking about the extensive margin, changes come from two
sources: i) new foreign or domestic firms that enter the Chilean economy and ii) firms
that were domestic at the beginning of the sample and, at some point, started to have
foreign holdings.
VII. Testable Hypotheses
VII.I Foreign Presence
The first testable hypothesis follows Branstetter et al. (2007) in the sense that it is
important to capture whether stronger IPR lead to an increased overall presence of
foreign firms in Chile at the industry level.
Thus, some measure of the foreign presence, such as the capital stock, in the industry
is needed. In this sense, an indicator in the spirit of import penetration would be the
“foreign penetration” of a given industry, which can be constructed for each industry
as follows:
fdikstockj =
Pf
jPf+d
j
=
Sum of capital stock for foreign plants
Sum of capital stock for all plants
(3)
Therefore, the specification that could be used in order to test for changes in the
“FDI penetration” could take the following form:
fdikstockjt = ↵j + t+  0IPRt +  1IPRt⇤Techj +  2Xj + "jt (4)
where j indexes each industry and t the year; ↵i captures industry fixed e↵ects, and
t is a time trend; IPRt is the strength of IPR; Techj is a dummy variable that takes
the value one if the firm is technologically intensive and zero otherwise; and Xj are the
controls.26
Moreover, since the transition matrices and the overall data on FDI in the manu-
facturing sector seem lower after 2005, it is plausible that the foreign presence is being
replaced by domestic firms. This would lead more foreign plants to exit the market and
could increase the amount that plants pay for licenses and foreign technical assistance.
This can be tested using the following specifications:
26The generation of the Techi dummy will be explained later. The controls include average size and
the market where the industry sells its product.
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kstockjt = ↵j + t+  0IPRt +  1IPRt⇤Techj +  2Xj + "jt (5)
where the subscripts are similar to those in equation (4).
VII.I.1 Generating the test and comparison groups
To obtain a valid interaction term in equation 4, it is crucial to have valid test and com-
parison groups. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between technologically intensive
and non-technologically intensive plants to form the Techi dummy in equation (4).
This can be done by letting each plant be technologically intensive if it belongs
to industries that are considered high-tech in other countries. In this case, the Com-
pendium of Patent Statistics elaborated by the OECD is used to define high-tech in-
dustries.27 The technologically intensive industries using the ISIC Rev.3 classification
(at the 2-digit level) are medical, precision and optical instruments; radio, television
and communication equipment; o ce accounting and computing machinery; and phar-
maceuticals.28
The descriptive statistics for each group of foreign plants are presented in table 8
in the appendix. First, note that the stock of capital and value added are lower for
tech-intensive plants. This could be due to size issues with the plants (e.g., non-tech
plants might need more buildings in the manufacturing sector). Nevertheless, it is clear
that payments for licenses, skill intensity and skill ratio are higher for high-tech plants,
which is expected. Second, regarding the remaining variables, the values are similar for
both groups, which is also expected.
VII.II Ownership of Firms
The second testable hypothesis concern the e↵ect of stronger IPR on the probability of
foreign ownership of the plant. In this case, it is possible to use a random e↵ects probit
model to examine the e↵ects of the level of IPR as well as the e↵ects on technological
intensive plants. Ownership, as previously defined, relies on a 10% capital rule, provid-
ing a categorical variable that equals one when the plant is foreign and zero when it is
domestic. The specification in this case would take the form:
ownerit = ↵0 +  1IPRt +  2IPRt⇤Techi +  3Techi +  4Xit + "it (6)
where i indexes each plant and t the year; IPRt and Techi are defined as in equation
equation (6); and Xt is a set of controls at the country level, such as the exchange rate
27 It is important to note that the patent classification is not fully compatible with the ISIC industry
classification, but the OECD based their classification on the comparison of Scmoch et al. (2003).
28Since there is no pharmaceuticals industry in the ISIC Rev.3, this category is replaced by industrial
chemicals and other chemicals.
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and inflation. Controls at the plant level, such as plant size in the market of service,
are also included.
VIII. Preliminary Results
VIII.I Foreign Presence
The first test is conducted with the full sample. To understand intuition behind the
results, we can consider the total ”foreign penetration” index (see figure 5). We observe
that foreign presence decreases after 2005 in the tech-intensive sectors and increases
slightly for the remaining sectors. This is in line with the hypothesis that foreign plants
are being replaced with domestic ones, especially in the tech-intensive sectors, resulting
in more licensing payments.
This should be reflected by a negative coe cient on the interaction term in equation
4. In a similar fashion, when looking at the Index of License Payments (figure 6), the
upward trend in the technological sector suggests that there is more licensing after 2005
in the high-tech sectors. Thus, we would expect a positive sign on the interaction term
in equation equation (5).
The results obtained after using specifications 4 and equation (5) are depicted in
Table 9 (see the appendix). As expected, the interaction term with IPR has a negative
e↵ect on the level of foreign presence. Moreover, the e↵ect on the level of licensing is
positive and significant. This supports the hypothesized reduction in the number of
foreign plants and increase in licensing in Chile after the reform29.
Figure 5: Foreign Presence Index
29It is important to note that no controls have been included in this specification, since the industry
and time dummies control for anything that happens at the industry or country level. However, the
results are robust to the inclusion of variables that vary at the country level. Additionally, the number
of observations is not a multiple of the number of industries because the panel is unbalanced such that
some industries are not present in some years.
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Figure 6: License Payments Index
When using the random e↵ects probit (table 10), it is possible to show that higher
levels of IPR have a negative e↵ect on the probability of being a foreign plant. This is
highly significant for the Fraser Institute index and the dummy measure of IPR.
Moreover, the e↵ect tends to be lower for high-tech plants, since all the interaction
terms are positive and significant. This supports the hypothesis depicted in the transi-
tion matrix that with stronger levels of IPR, the probability of being a foreign-owned
plant is significantly reduced. Additionally, foreign owners tend to ’stay’ in the high-
tech sectors relative to low-tech sectors. This could be due to the fact that Chilean
plants are capable, at least in the last few years, of reproducing whatever the foreign
plant was producing.
IX. Conclusions
The importance of FDI for economic growth has been emphasized throughout the eco-
nomics literature. Moreover, developing countries rely on FDI as a source of technology
transfer and innovation. Thus, it is important to clarify the most e↵ective channels
through which a developing country can benefit from the technology advancements of
developed countries.
In the present state of globalization, IPR a↵ect the decisions of MNEs to invest
abroad. This has been shown in previous studies that find that stronger IPR lead to
higher FDI and higher quality FDI being sent abroad.
However, not many studies focus on inward FDI. In that sense, the present study
constitutes a contribution to the literature. Moreover, we use di↵erent measures of IPR
in order to validate the results, and the extensive nature of the data allows for the
testing of hypothesis that could previously only be partially performed.
Preliminary results show that, despite previous studies, stronger IPR led to lower
levels of FDI in Chile during the 2001–2007 period. One of the main causes for the
reversal of the results presented in Branstetter et al. (2007), for example, is that Chilean
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firms have changed considerably in the last decade, increasing their imitative capabilities
and being able to produce goods that were not previously produced by local firms.
When taking these factors into account, it is possible to test whether foreign firms
have left the market since the reform. The results are consistent with the body of
literature arguing that licensing overtakes FDI once an IPR threshold is reached.
The relevant IPR threshold and the e↵ects of IPR reform on licensing do not depend
entirely on the IPR level per se but depend most importantly on the level of development
of the host country and its ability react to changes in IPR. Moreover, it is possible to
examine whether spillover e↵ects from foreign firms to domestic firms occurred after
the reform and whether the remaining domestic firms benefitted from greater access to
technology that could possibly be imitated.
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Appendix
A. FDI in Chile
Table 6: FDI by Economic Sector 1998-2007 Under DL600 (US Millions of dollars)
Sub-Sector/period 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Agriculture and fanning 13 21 23 10 2 0 0 1 3 1
Forestry and logging 38 16 4 1 1 1 0 7 17 108
Fishing and aquaculture 8 0 92 5 0 10 0 0 0 11
Coal mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Petroleum and natural gas production 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Metal ore mining 2,308 1,244 161 1,043 1,854 313 334 507 317 68
Other mining 161 92 73 94 149 80 16 82 809 236
Food, beverages and tobacco 67 407 44 273 29 55 56 186 70 20
Textiles and leather industries 6 19 4 4 2 0 18 1 0 0
Wood and wood products 30 24 27 7 12 6 1 3 2 7
Paper products, printing and publishing 56 23 2 51 37 119 81 1 2 16
Chemical, rubber and plastics 308 232 94 344 32 0 271 1 0 7
Non-Metallic mineral products 16 60 9 24 1 1 2 1 21 3
Basic metal industries 21 37 58 86 99 1 0 0 0 0
Metal products, machinery and equipment 27 30 14 19 6 1 0 6 0 16
Other manufacturing industries 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electricity, gas and steam 481 3,971 858 861 223 114 2,193 33 1,141 64
Water works and supply 14 569 1 47 250 36 0 65 65 105
Construction 279 211 29 164 138 29 119 8 9 2
Wholesale and retail trade 190 86 120 114 72 43 17 3 19 263
Restaurants and hotels 31 3 32 51 4 5 0 5 2 1
Transport and storage 132 26 15 35 5 55 24 55 172 16
Communication 91 388 856 1,246 331 283 1,402 515 65 66
Banking 393 787 189 60 31 13 0 7 13 84
Investment companies 391 143 74 40 16 28 7 105 107 110
Investment funds 0 0 2 13 3 3 1 4 3 2
Risk capital investment funds 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 1 5
Other financial services 29 20 8 8 9 0 3 5 0 47
Insurance 702 208 90 265 20 4 49 107 23 10
Real estate activities 37 24 8 21 3 0 19 7 57 13
Engineering and business services 69 26 66 60 39 21 15 55 93 71
Sewage, sanitation and similar services 20 471 2 3 1 1 0 2 0 0
Social and related community services 0 0 11 44 7 10 0 0 167 3
Recreation and cultural services 88 81 68 25 5 2 5 16 3 2
Other services 25 8 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Manufacturing sector 530 833 253 812 218 184 430 199 95 69
As % of total 9. 9. 8. 16. 6. 15. 9. 11. 3.00 5.
Total per period 6,038 9,229 3,039 5,023 3,381 1,236 4,637 1,799 3,181 1,359
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Table 7: Distribution of Firms according to Sector
!SIC rev.3 at 2-digit level Observations Description
15 11,217 Manufacture of food products and beverages
17 1,724 Manufacture of textiles
18 1,841 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
19 938 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage,
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear
20 2,432 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
21 1,050 Manufacture of paper and paper products
22 1,796 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
24 2,127 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
25 2,219 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products
26 1,913 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
27 920 Manufacture of basic metals
28 2,567 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery
and equipment
29 1,953 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
30 12 Manufacture of o ce, accounting and computing machinery
31 515 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
32 55 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment
and apparatus
33 212 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments,
watches and clocks
34 512 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 323 Manufacture of other transport equipment
36 1,700 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
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B. Descriptive Statistics and Results
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics (Tech Vs. Non-tech Firms)
Variable Non-Tech Plants (33,620 plants) Tech Intensive plants (2,406 plants)
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Capital Stock 2255. 24182. 0 2.E+06 7593. 46920. 0 1.E+06
% Domesic Capital 96. 17. 0 100 81. 38. 0 100
% Foreign Capital 4. 17. 0 100 19. 38. 0 100
Value Added 2566. 21593. -1.E+05 2.E+06 9848. 64529. -6443. 2.E+06
Sale Of Production 4230. 27287. 0 2.E+06 15164. 1.E+05 0 2.E+06
License And Foreign Assistance 5. 83. 0 5578. 59. 497. 0 11864.
Income Due To Exports 1696. 17559. 0 1.E+06 2930. 20472. 0 4.E+05
Number of Skilled Workers 14. 56. 0 2691 22. 72. 0 1057
Skilled/Unskilled workers ratio 0.69 4. 0 287 0.97 5. 0 139
Skillid/Total workers ratio 0.24 0.3 0 1 0.24 0.29 0 1
Table 9: Foreign Presence and Licensing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables fdikstock fdikstock fdikstock license license license
WEF IPR. x Tech -0.17* 0.
(0.) (0.)
Fraser IPR x Tech -0.03*** 0.11**
(0.) (0.)
Dummy IPR. x Tech M.09*** 0.31**
(0.) (0.)
Observations 748 748 748 748 748 748
R.-squared 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.88 0.88 0.87
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Random E↵ects Probit
]
(1) (2) (3)
Variables owner owner owner
WEF IPR x Tech 0.84***
(0.)
Fraser IPR x Tech 0.76***
(0.)
Dummy IPR x Tech 0.70***
(0.)
iprwef 0.73
(1.)
iprf -0.35***
(0.)
dipr -0.69***
(0.)
Real Exchange Rate 0. M.04** M.04**
(0.) (0.) (0.)
Average Size 0.79*** 0.80*** 0.86*”
(0.) (0.) (0.)
Inflation 0. 0.09 0.06
(0.) (0.) (0.)
Observations 37,254 37,254 37,254
Number of id 8,287 8,287 8,287
Time Dummies YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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